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Baker v. Nelson:
Flotsam in the Tidal Wave of Windsor’s Wake
David B. Cruz*

Introduction
In June 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States issued rulings in two
cases dealing with issues of same-sex couples’ constitutional rights to marry and
to have their marriages recognized. In Hollingsworth v. Perry, the Court failed
to reach the merits of the question whether California’s initiative that amended
the state constitution to strip same-sex couples of their right to marry violated the
Constitution of the United States; instead, the Court dismissed the case because
the ballot sponsors attempting to appeal their losses in the federal district court
and court of appeals lacked standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution.1 In
United States v. Windsor, the Court held unconstitutional Section 3 of the so-called
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which had purported to define “marriage” for
federal law purposes as a “union of one man and one woman,” requiring the federal
government to ignore the marriages many same-sex couples had by then entered in
various U.S. states or other countries.2
In Windsor’s wake we have seen a metaphoric “tidal wave” of litigation3 in
every state that still excludes same-sex couples from marriage, as well as Puerto
Rico, brought by same-sex couples seeking the right to marry under the Due Process
* Professor of Law, University of Southern California Gould School of Law. I am grateful to
my fellow panelists and the audience at the Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality Symposium, “Social Equality: ‘At Home and Abroad,’” where I presented an earlier version of this
Article on a panel on “Equality in Marriage and the Family,” and to Steve Greene, for their
helpful comments and questions, as well as to Melissa Shinto and Kyle Jones for their excellent
research assistance.
1. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
2. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
3. Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 546 & n.6 (W.D. Ky. 2014).
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and/or Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution. As of Labor Day 2014, the
cases that had ruled on preliminary or final relief for same-sex couples seeking to
secure the right to marry or to live their lives as a married couple in their home states
after marrying elsewhere have unanimously ruled in favor of marriage equality/
same-sex couples’ access to civil marriage; with but three outliers alongside fiftyseven marriage equality vindications in such cases as of December 8, 2014, almost
ninety-five percent of post-Windsor cases have supported marriage equality.4
Part I of this Article sketches the virtually unbroken string of pro-marriage
decisions between Windsor and Labor Day 2014 to give a sense of the size and
magnitude of this “tidal wave” of precedent. Next, Part II briefly explores some of
the reasons that might help account for the flood of litigation and overwhelmingly
positive outcomes. Part III tentatively suggests one way this flow of decisions in
favor of marriage equality might influence the Supreme Court when it returns to the
issue, and then shows one particular aspect of Windsor’s wake: the way it has helped
lower federal courts nearly unanimously conclude that doctrinal developments after
the Supreme Court summarily rejected a same-sex couple’s constitutional claims to
a right to marry in Baker v. Nelson in 19725 have rendered that decision no longer
dispositive. Although Baker would in no event prevent the Supreme Court itself
from revisiting the constitutional issues, the ability to declare Baker doctrinally
undermined has positive repercussions for the social equality and lived reality of
same-sex couples across the country in the meantime. Finally, Part IV of the Article
addresses some of the ways in which United States v. Windsor itself developed
4. See Adam Polaski, Federal Judge in Mississippi Rules Marriage Ban Unconstitutional,
Freedom to Marry (Nov. 25, 2014, 9:08 PM), http://www.freedomtomarry.org/blog/entry/
federal-judge-in-mississippi-rules-marriage-ban-unconstitutional (“[The November 25, 2014,
federal district court ruling holding Mississippi’s marriage ban unconstitutional was] the 56th
court ruling since June 2013 in favor of the freedom to marry. Just four courts—most notably, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit—upheld marriage discrimination. Plaintiffs
from the 6th Circuit cases, out of Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio and Tennessee, are now seeking
review from that out-of-step ruling from the United States Supreme Court. The plaintiffs in
a case out of Louisiana, where a federal judge upheld marriage discrimination in September,
are also seeking Supreme Court review.”); see also Marriage Rulings in the Courts, Freedom
to Marry http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/marriage-rulings-in-the-courts (last updated
Dec. 8, 2014) (“There have been 57 victories for the freedom to marry since June 2013, when
the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the core of the so-called Defense of Marriage Act in
Windsor v. United States. Thirty-six pro-marriage rulings have been issued in federal court,
sixteen have been issued in state court, and five have been issued by a federal appellate court.
. . . In four cases, judges have upheld laws denying the freedom to marry to same-sex couples:
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit upheld bans in KY, MI, OH and TN; federal
judges have upheld discrimination in Louisiana and Puerto Rico; and a Tennessee state court
case denied respect for a couple’s marriage for the purpose of the marriage’s dissolution.”).
The Tennessee couple was not seeking the right to live together as a married couple. See infra
text accompanying notes 163−68.
5. 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
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constitutional doctrine in ways that advance the cause of constitutional justice and
same-sex couples’ rights to equal protection and to marry.
I.

The Torrent of Windsor’s Wake

United States v. Windsor was decided June 26, 2013.6 Less than a month later,
on July 22, an Ohio federal court in Obergefell v. Kasich, relying on Windsor and
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, granted a preliminary
injunction requiring the state to recognize the Maryland marriage of an Ohio
couple, one of whom was terminally ill.7 On September 27, a New Jersey court in
Garden State Equality v. Dow relied on Windsor to hold that civil unions failed to
provide same-sex couples the full equality required by the state constitution;8 when
New Jersey chose not to appeal, marriage equality became the law in the Garden
State. On December 10, a federal court in Illinois in Lee v. Orr, following an earlier
decision for one couple, relied on Windsor and the Equal Protection Clause to grant
a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction requiring Illinois to let
a class of medically critical plaintiffs marry in advance of the July 1 effective date
for the new state law allowing same-sex couples to marry.9 Just over a week later,
on December 19, New Mexico’s high court relied on Windsor to hold in Griego
v. Oliver that the state constitution’s equal protection clause required same-sex
couples be allowed to marry.10 The next day, December 20, a federal court in Utah
in Kitchen v. Herbert relied on Windsor to grant summary judgment on federal equal
protection and due process claims, requiring the state to let same-sex couples marry
and to recognize their marriages from other jurisdictions11 and resulting in hundreds
of couples marrying there before the U.S. Supreme Court eventually stepped in to
stay the judgment pending appeal.12 Three days later, on December 23, the same
federal judge in Ohio who ruled in Obergefell v. Kasich, now acting under the case
name Obergefell v. Wymyslo (Obergefell II), granted a declaratory judgment and
permanent injunction requiring Ohio to recognize marriages of same-sex couples
from other states on death certificates—a conclusion which Judge Timothy Black
said “flow[ed] from the Windsor decision of the United States Supreme Court.”13
After the public enjoyed a break for the holidays, on January 14, 2014, a
federal court in Oklahoma decided Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, granting
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs challenging the state’s marriage
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
No. 1:13-CV-501, 2013 WL 3814262, at *1 (S.D. Ohio July 22, 2013).
82 A.3d 336 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2013).
No. 13-CV-8719, 2013 WL 6490577 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2013).
316 P.3d 865 (N.M. 2013).
961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014).
Herbert v. Kitchen, 134 S. Ct. 893 (2014).
962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 973 (S.D. Ohio 2013).

163

Spring 2015				

Flotsam in the Tidal Wave of Windsor’s Wake

exclusion laws, citing Windsor.14 Less than a month later, on February 12, a federal
court in Kentucky in Bourke v. Beshear relied on Windsor and granted the plaintiff
couple a final judgment requiring the state to recognize valid marriages of samesex couples from other jurisdictions as a matter of federal equal protection law.15
The next day, a second federal court gave the country a Valentine’s present: On
February 13 a Virginia federal court granted the plaintiffs summary judgment in
Bostic v. Rainey,16 a marriage case joined by Prop 8-challenging attorneys Ted
Olson and David Boies. It ruled, again relying on Windsor, that the Constitution
requires Virginia to let same-sex couples marry and to recognize their marriages
from other jurisdictions.17 A week-and-a-half later, on February 21, a federal court
in Illinois granted unopposed final summary judgment in Lee v. Orr II requiring
the state to allow marriage for all gay and lesbian couples in Cook County
immediately, not July 1 when the state legislature’s new law opening civil marriage
to same-sex couples was to go into effect.18 Less than a week later, on February
26, a federal court in Texas in De Leon v. Perry relied on Windsor to grant the
plaintiffs a preliminary injunction requiring the state to allow same-sex couples to
marry and to recognize such marriages from other jurisdictions.19 Less than twoand-a-half weeks after that, on March 14, a federal court in Tennessee in Tanco v.
Haslam invoked Windsor in granting a preliminary injunction requiring interstate
recognition of validly contracted marriages of three same-sex couples.20 The week
after that, on March 21, a federal court in Michigan ruled in DeBoer v. Snyder, citing
Windsor, and granting the plaintiffs a permanent injunction requiring marriage (and
it seems, recognition of marriages from other jurisdictions)21 following a trial that
eviscerated the junk science of Mark Regnerus.22
Three weeks plus a weekend later, on April 14, the same judge of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio who ruled in the Obergefell litigation
relied on Windsor and granted permanent injunctive relief in Henry v. Himes against
any enforcement of Ohio’s laws refusing to recognize valid marriages of samesex couples contracted elsewhere, concluding that the state’s marriage recognition
14. 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1258, 1279, 1288, 1294, 1296 (N.D. Okla. 2014), aff’d and stay
granted sub nom. Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014).
15. 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 548−50 & n.14, 557−58 (W.D. Ky. 2014).
16. 970 F. Supp. 2d 456 (E.D. Va. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352
(4th Cir. 2014).
17. Id. at 475−76, 483−84.
18. Lee v. Orr (Lee v. Orr II), No. 13-CV-8719, 2014 WL 683680 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2014).
19. 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 639−40, 655, 659, 662 (W.D. Tex. 2014).
20. 7 F. Supp. 3d 759 (M.D. Tenn. 2014), stay denied sub nom. Jesty v. Haslam, No. 3:13CV-01159, 2014 WL 1117069 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2014).
21. 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014).
22. Id. at 765−66 (“The Court finds Regnerus’s testimony entirely unbelievable and not
worthy of serious consideration.”).
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ban “is facially unconstitutional and unenforceable in any context whatsoever.”23
Four days after that, relying on Windsor for both standing and its merits analysis, a
federal court in Indiana granted a temporary restraining order requiring the state to
recognize an out-of-state marriage of a lesbian couple, one of whom was diagnosed
with terminal cancer, in Baskin v. Bogan.24 The court extended this to a preliminary
injunction on May 8, relying on Windsor and post-Windsor district court decisions
to find a likelihood of success.25 Five days later, a federal magistrate judge held
Idaho’s marriage exclusion laws unconstitutional in Latta v. Otter, again relying
on Windsor.26 Less than a week later, a different federal trial judge in Utah relied
on Windsor in Evans v. Utah and preliminarily enjoined the state from denying
recognition to those same-sex couples married lawfully between Kitchen v. Herbert
and the Supreme Court’s issuance of a stay of that judgment.27 The same day as
Evans, a federal district court in Geiger v. Kitzhaber relied on Windsor and held
Oregon’s marriage exclusions unconstitutional.28 The next day, a federal district
court relied on Windsor in ruling in Whitewood v. Wolf that Pennsylvania’s marriage
exclusions were unconstitutional.29
Two-and-a-half weeks later, on June 6, in a different Wolf case, Wolf v.
Walker, a federal court invoked Windsor and held Wisconsin’s marriage exclusions
unconstitutional.30 Less than three weeks later the federal court in Baskin v. Bogan
extended the preliminary injunction against Indiana’s marriage exclusions to a
permanent injunction.31 The same day, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit affirmed Kitchen v. Herbert by a two-to-one vote, with the majority relying on
Windsor.32 Six days later, on July 1, the federal court that ruled in Bourke v. Beshear
extended its holding from interstate recognition to the right to enter into marriage in
Kentucky, holding in the poetically named Love v. Beshear that the state’s marriage
exclusion violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.33
Less than three weeks later, on July 18, the same U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit panel majority that struck down Utah’s marriage exclusions continued
23. 14 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1044 (S.D. Ohio 2014). The court did allow the parties to brief
whether or not this injunction should be stayed pending appeal, id. at 1062 n.27, and on April
16 granted such a stay of the facial invalidation but not of the injunctive relief as applied to
the specific plaintiff couples. Henry v. Himes, No. 1:14-CV-129, 2014 WL 1512541 (S.D.
Ohio Apr. 16, 2014).
24. 12 F. Supp. 3d 1137 (S.D. Ind. 2014).
25. Baskin v. Bogan, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1026−27 (S.D. Ind. 2014).
26. 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1059−60, 1075−77, 1080, 1082, 1084−87 (D. Idaho 2014).
27. 21 F. Supp. 3d 1192, 1196−98, 1202−03, 1214−15 (D. Utah 2014).
28. 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1138−39, 1147−48 (D. Or. 2014).
29. 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 421, 424−26, 431 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
30. 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 986−87, 990−91, 1010, 1015, 1017−18, 1023−24 (W.D. Wis.
2014).
31. 12 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1164−65 (S.D. Ind. 2014).
32. 755 F.3d 1193, 1199, 1213−16, 1226, 1228 (10th Cir. 2014).
33. 989 F. Supp. 2d 536 (W.D. Ky. 2014).
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the summer loving, holding Oklahoma’s marriage exclusions unconstitutional in Bishop
v. Smith.34 Ten days later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit became the
second federal appeals court to hold state marriage exclusions unconstitutional, relying
on Windsor and ruling two-to-one in Bostic v. Schaefer that Virginia’s exclusion of
same-sex couples from civil marriage, like its earlier exclusion of different-race couples,
violated the fundamental right to marry protected by the U.S. Constitution.35 Three-anda-half-weeks later, in the final marriage ruling before Labor Day 2014, a federal district
court also invoked Windsor and granted same-sex couples a preliminary injunction
against enforcement of Florida’s marriage exclusions.36
II.

Explanations for Windsor’s Wake

Why are we seeing what the Kentucky decision of Bourke v. Beshear called
“a virtual tidal wave of . . . judicial judgments in other states [that] have repealed,
invalidated, or otherwise abrogated state laws restricting same-sex couples’ access
to marriage and marriage recognition”?37 Why are we seeing so much litigation and
such uniformly positive results? The answers are probably overdetermined.
The post-Windsor precedential landscape may seem more striking due to
the seeming rapidity with which it has been shaped by the lower courts—dozens of
rulings with victories for marriage equality within fourteen months after Windsor.
Some of this speed is genuine. Cincinnati couple James Obergefell and John Arthur
flew to Maryland to marry on July 11 and secured a temporary restraining order on
July 22;38 on September 26 an Ohio funeral director joined the suit as a plaintiff
to broaden the scope of the litigation and eventual relief.39 The plaintiffs in the
Illinois, Kentucky, Virginia, Tennessee, New Mexico, and Utah cases described
above all filed their suits no earlier than the U.S. Supreme Court’s arguments in
the marriage cases in March 2013. Other cases, however, preceded the Supreme
Court’s consideration of Windsor. The original complaint in the Michigan case was
filed in 2012;40 the New Jersey case in 2011;41 and the Oklahoma suit in 2004.42
34. 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014).
35. 760 F.3d 352, 377−79 (4th Cir. 2014).
36. Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1281, 1293 (N.D. Fla. 2014).
37. 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 546 (W.D. Ky. 2014).
38. Obergefell v. Kasich, No. 1:13–cv–501, 2013 WL 3814262, at *2, *7 (S.D. Ohio July
22, 2013).
39. See Second Amended Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order and Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief, Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (No. 13-cv501) (filed Sept. 26, 2013).
40. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Deboer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d
757 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (No. 2:12-cv-10285) (filed Jan. 23, 2012).
41. Complaint, Garden State Equality v. Dow, 82 A.3d 336 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2013)
(No. ML-001729-11) (filed June 29, 2011).
42. Complaint, Bishop v. Oklahoma, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Okla. 2014) (No. 4:04-cv848) (filed Nov. 3, 2004).
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Windsor may thus be seen as an accelerator for these cases.
Although some of this litigation pre-dated Windsor, why are we seeing so
much now—at least eighty-six cases in Puerto Rico and every state that did not allow
same-sex couples to marry?43 The motivations of same-sex couples offer a partial
explanation. Many same-sex couples want to marry. They want to secure the legal
protections for their relationship, and for the children that many of them are raising,
that marriage affords. Like Indiana marriage plaintiffs Lane Stumler and Michael
Drury, they are sick of being treated as second-class citizens by governments that
are supposed to serve us all:
Stumler, 66, said he is now motivated to stand up for his rights after
seeing gay rights openly discussed each day in the media debating
“my worth as a human being or trying to decide [if] the DNA I was
born [with] disqualifies me from being equal to everyone else.”
Drury said public opinion has evolved to be more accepting of samesex couples, and he is ready for Indiana leaders to catch up.44
They are sick of waiting, and they believe that justice delayed is justice denied. For
example, as one news story reported:
[Another Indiana marriage plaintiff Jo Ann] Dale said U.S. vs.
Windsor has caused a lot of confusion for same-sex couples trying
to understand what their rights are, and it’s made some in Indiana
impatient with the state’s stand against gay marriage. “Right now is
the time,” she said. “Let’s clear it up. Let’s get it straightened out.
Let’s make sure it is the same understanding everywhere.”45
Part of the wave of marriage equality litigation can be explained as
the concerted effort of national advocacy organizations, loosely comparable
to the campaign against segregation waged by the NAACP.46 In the words
of the ACLU of Florida:
43. Pending Marriage Equality Cases, Lambda Legal (2014), http://www.lambdalegal.
org/sites/default/files/pending_marriage_equality_cases_as_of_12-18.pdf (scorecard as of
Dec. 18, 2014).
44. Gary Popp, Southern Indiana Couples Want Equal Rights in Same-Sex Suit, News
& Trib. (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.newsandtribune.com/news/clark_county/p-m-updatesouthern-indiana-couples-want-equal-rights-in/article_daef5e28-5444-51c9-823f-ce2ab961bd97.html.
45. Id.
46. Cf., e.g., Jennifer L. Levi, Paving the Road: A Charles Hamilton Houston Approach to
Securing Trans Rights, 7 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 5, 8−12 (2000) (describing NAACP
campaign to overturn segregation).

167

Spring 2015				

Flotsam in the Tidal Wave of Windsor’s Wake

Following our victory last June in the Windsor case at the Supreme
Court, which largely ended federal marriage discrimination . . . the
ACLU has been organizing legislative and ballot initiatives and
also building lawsuits across the country–so far in Pennsylvania,
Virginia, North Carolina, and Oregon–to ensure that the case that
reaches the Supreme Court next leads to the nationwide solution we
are all working so hard for.47
And the advocacy organizations have understandably filed suits in many
states that offer same-sex couples no relationship recognition following the
seemingly baffled responses of several Justices at oral argument in the Prop 8 case
Perry to suggestions that it rule narrowly that it is unconstitutional for states to
offer same-sex couples everything but the official status of “marriage.” Justice
Kennedy, for example, when Ted Olson asked the Court to invalidate all marriage
bans, suggested:
The rationale of the Ninth Circuit was much more narrow. It
basically said that California, which has been more generous, more
open to protecting same-sex couples than almost any State in the
Union, just didn’t go far enough, and it’s being penalized for not
going far enough. That’s a very odd rationale on which to sustain
this opinion.48
Justices Alito, Roberts, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor all expressed similar
sentiments. I believe this line of questioning reflected confusion between conditions
sufficient for a marriage regime’s unconstitutionality and conditions necessary for
unconstitutionality. That is, those challenging California’s Proposition 8 were not
arguing that it was necessary to the unconstitutionality of a state’s relationship
recognition laws that they offer same-sex couples all the same legal consequences
but withhold the designation “marriage.” Rather, they were arguing that the existence
of a parallel domestic partnership status under state law showed that the state had
no functional justification for denying same-sex couples access to civil marriage
and so sufficed to make California’s marriage exclusion unconstitutional. Be that
as it may, the reactions of the Justices make sensible the targeting of states that do
nothing for same-sex couples and their families for constitutional challenges after
Perry and Windsor.
47. John M. Becker, Six Couples Sue to Overturn Florida Marriage Ban, Bilerico Project
(Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.bilerico.com/2014/01/six_couples_sue_to_overturn_florida_marriage_ban.php.
48. Transcript of Oral Argument at 42−43, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013)
(No. 12-144).
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Moreover, the successes in Windsor’s wake are themselves breeding further
litigation: “Courts throughout the country are recognizing that this is an issue of
basic dignity and fundamental fairness,” explained an attorney in one challenge
to Florida’s marriage exclusion.49 In the words of the ACLU of Florida: “We are
hopeful that the court hearing this case will agree with courts across the country
that the Constitution requires that same-sex couples be permitted to marry.”50 An
attorney for Indiana plaintiffs explained to the press: “We are asking the Indiana
federal court to recognize what every other court in the country has recognized”
since Windsor.51
III.

The Impacts of Windsor: The Supreme Court, the Dynamic Meaning of
Windsor, and the Insignificance of Baker v. Nelson

This Part addresses two aspects of the possible impact of United States
v. Windsor. First, it briefly broaches the possibility that the meaning of Windsor
will be determined in a dynamic process in which the spreading consensus on
Windsor’s implications for state marriage exclusions will influence courts’—or at
least the Supreme Court’s—future understanding of Windsor. Second, this Part in
more detail evaluates lower courts’ near-unanimous conclusion that the Supreme
Court’s summary 1972 decision in Baker v. Nelson, rejecting due process and
equal protection challenges to state laws excluding same-sex couples from civil
marriage, has been swept away by subsequent doctrinal developments. Although
not every facet of the lower courts’ reasoning on this point is persuasive, most of
the argument is sound, and these courts have been right not to let Baker preclude
them from doing justice under the Constitution to the real people who have turned
to them for vindication of their rights.
A. The Potential Relevance of Windsor to its Ultimate Meaning
Part of the reason I presented the extent of marriage equality precedent after
United States v. Windsor in some detail in Part I above is that it is plausible that this
dramatic consensus among the lower courts might influence the federal courts of
appeals and even the U.S. Supreme Court in their resolution of the constitutionality
or unconstitutionality of state marriage exclusions in Windsor’s wake. When the
Supreme Court decides a case without a majority opinion,52 black letter doctrine
49.

Equal. Fla. Inst. & Nat’l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights, Six Same-Sex Couples and EqualFlorida Institute File Lawsuit Seeking the Freedom to Marry in Florida (2014), http://
eqfl.org/sites/default/files/images/pr012114.pdf.
50. Becker, supra note 47.
51. Popp, supra note 44.
52. Windsor was decided by a majority opinion, but the analogical relevance of the discussion above will be made explicit.
ity
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from Marks v. United States is that “the holding of the Court may be viewed as
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment[ ] on the
narrowest grounds.”53 This means that the position of a plurality of Justices need
not state the holding; a single Justice concurring in the judgment states the holding
if her or his position is narrower. Yet the Marks inquiry is not as straightforward
as that formulation might suggest, for the Court has never defined what makes
reasoning narrow or the narrowest; “[c]onsequently, for decades, commentators
and judges alike have vocally lamented the opacity of this instruction.”54
Scholarship by Justin Marceau from the University of Denver, however, has
argued that when the Supreme Court decides cases without a majority opinion, thus
leaving the actual holding of the case up to contestation under Marks, the Supreme
Court in future decisions tends to read such cases as holding in accordance with
a plurality opinion if the lower courts have converged on that position. “If lower
courts settle on the holding of a Supreme Court plurality, then the Court is likely
to embrace that as the law of the land.”55 Thus, in Professor Marceau’s view,
“the Marks rule is less a device for divining clear precedent and more profitably
viewed as an invitation for a referendum among the lower courts on the statutory or
constitutional question at issue.”56
Windsor was not a plurality decision, but in not resolving the constitutionality
of state marriage bans57 or refusals to give interstate recognition to same-sex
couples’ marriages, and in delivering a doctrinally opaque opinion,58 Windsor may
function like a plurality decision. The meaning of Windsor and of the constitutional
guarantees of equality and liberty on which it rests need to be resolved.59 A consensus
in the lower courts about Windsor could stiffen the resolve of some Justices to
follow the Supreme Court’s logic where it leads, as even Justice Scalia recognized
in his Windsor dissent60—which was cited, incidentally, by the district courts in
53. 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
54. Justin Marceau, Plurality Decisions: Upward-Flowing Precedent and Acoustic Separation, 45 Conn. L. Rev. 933, 936 (2013).
55. Id. at 965.
56. Id. at 938.
57. At least one version of this question was at issue in Hollingsworth v. Perry, though the
Court ducked it by holding that the petitioners lacked standing to appeal from the trial court’s
judgment in Perry. See 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
58. E.g., Marc R. Poirier, “Whiffs of Federalism” in United States v. Windsor: Power, Localism, and Kulturkampf, 85 U. Colo. L. Rev. 935, 941 (2014) (“In Windsor, Justice Kennedy
exercises considerable caution, refraining from articulating either a clear federalism rule or a
clear equal protection or substantive due process liberty rule that would resolve the marriage
equality question once and for all.”).
59. Cf. David B. Cruz, “Amorphous Federalism” and the Supreme Court’s Marriage
Cases, 47 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 393, 441 (2014) (“[T]he meaning of Windsor for questions of
interstate recognition will unfold with experience and time.”).
60. [T]he view that this Court will take of state prohibition of same-sex marriage is
indicated beyond mistaking by today’s opinion. . . . [T]he real rationale of today’s opin-
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the Ohio,61 Utah,62 Oklahoma,63 Kentucky,64 Virginia,65 Pennsylvania,66 and Wisconsin67
cases, as well as by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in the Virginia case.68
B. Flushing Baker v. Nelson as an Obstacle to Marriage Equality
The proliferation of LGBT equality litigation could also be, in some measure,
prompted by the development of constitutional doctrine in Windsor, although
Windsor offered little to no explicit new constitutional equality law doctrine.69 The
development of doctrine, however, is important, not just in trying to understand
the phenomenon sweeping the courts of the nation in Windsor’s wake but also as a
matter of constitutional doctrine.
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Windsor,70 lower
courts had reached differing conclusions concerning whether the Supreme Court’s
1972 summary decision in Baker v. Nelson71 required lower courts to dismiss
challenges to state marriage exclusions.72 Following Windsor, however, the federal
ion . . . is that DOMA is motivated by “‘bare . . . desire to harm’” couples in same-sex
marriages. How easy it is, indeed how inevitable, to reach the same conclusion with
regard to state laws denying same-sex couples marital status. . . . As far as this Court is
concerned, no one should be fooled; it is just a matter of listening and waiting for the
other shoe.
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2709−10 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
61. Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 973−74 & n.1 (S.D. Ohio 2013); Oberfegell v. Kasich, No. 1:13-cv-501, 2013 WL 3814262, at *1 (S.D. Ohio July 22, 2013).
62. Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1194 (D. Utah 2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 1193
(10th Cir. 2014).
63. Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1278 (N.D. Okla. 2013),
aff’d sub nom. Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014).
64. Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 548, 550 n.14 (W.D. Ky. 2014).
65. Bostic v. Raney, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 476 (E.D. Va. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Bostic v.
Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014).
66. Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 425−26 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
67. Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 987, 996−97, 1010, 1017 (W.D. Wis. 2014), aff’d
sub nom. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014).
68. Bostic, 760 F.3d at 380.
69. I put to one side the way in which Windsor articulated new doctrine regarding standing
to appeal. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
70. Id.
71. 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
72. Compare, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 178−79 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Even if
Baker might have had resonance for Windsor’s case in 1971, it does not today. . . . In the forty
years after Baker, there have been manifold changes to the Supreme Court’s equal protection
jurisprudence.”), and Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 9, 17 n.4 (N.Y. 2006) (rejecting
the claim that Baker bars New York courts from hearing the parallel claim under the parallel
constitutional provision), with Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682
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courts, to reach the issue, have nearly unanimously held that Baker is no obstacle to
adjudicating such challenges.73 While I believe the best understanding of doctrine
F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2012) (“Baker is precedent binding on us unless repudiated by subsequent
Supreme Court precedent.”), Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 870−71 (8th
Cir. 2006) (noting but not relying on Baker, which the court cited in its conclusion only after
having conducted equal protection analysis of state constitutional amendment), McConnell
v. United States, 188 F. App’x 540 (8th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (in suit by Baker plaintiffs
seeking federal tax refund due to their supposed marriage, using merits determination in
Baker as part of the basis, along with McConnell v. Nooner, 547 F.2d 54 (8th Cir. 1976)
(per curiam), for issue preclusion against plaintiffs), Nooner, 547 F.2d at 56 (holding Baker
plaintiffs “collaterally estopped from relitigating” their claim to be married to receive extra
veteran’s educational benefits due to supposed spouse), Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp.
2d 1065, 1070 (D. Haw. 2012) (“Plaintiffs’ claims [challenging state marriage exclusion] are
foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s summary dismissal for want of a substantial federal question in Baker.”), vacated as moot, Nos. 12-16995, 12-16998, 2014 WL 5088199 (9th Cir. Oct.
10, 2014) (citing Hawaii Marriage Equality Act of 2013 as rendering decision moot), Sevcik
v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1002–03 (D. Nev. 2012) (“[T]he present equal protection
claim is precluded by Baker insofar as the claim does not rely on the Romer line of cases . . .
.”), Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1304−05 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (holding Baker binding
as to nonexistence of “fundamental right to enter into a same-sex marriage” and so dismissing
claims that federal non-recognition of marriage of lawfully married same-sex couple pursuant
to Defense of Marriage Act violates the Constitution, though curiously proceeding to analyze
and reject plaintiffs’ claim on their merits), Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124
(C.D. Cal. 1980) (deeming Baker “controlling” in federal immigration case involving putative
marriage of same-sex couple in Colorado, though failing even to note “subsequent doctrinal
developments” exception), Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (using
Baker as persuasive merits precedent as to U.S. Constitution in case involving solely claims
of right to marry under state constitution and descriptively/predictively opining that “[t]he
five justices of the Lawrence [v. Texas] majority, as well as Justice O’Connor in her concurring opinion, do not appear to be prepared to extend the logic of their reasoning to the recognition of same-sex marriage”), Hernandez v. Robles, 805 N.Y.S.2d 354, 368, 369 n.2 (App.
Div. 2005) (Catterson, J., concurring) (opposing majority which reached merits and asserting
that plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge to marriage exclusion “is foreclosed by” Baker due
to supposed equivalence of state and federal constitutional rights, relegating treatment of subsequent doctrinal developments to one shallow sentence in footnote about Lawrence v. Texas),
aff’d, 855 N.E.2d 1, 9, 17 n.4 (N.Y. 2006), and In re Cooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d 684, 685 (Sur.
Ct. 1990) (concluding in case brought by surviving member of unmarried same-sex couple
seeking an incident of marriage that “persons of the same sex have no constitutional rights to
enter into a marriage with each other,” citing Baker as precedent but not even noting “subsequent doctrinal developments” rule), aff’d, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (App. Div. 1993) (using Baker
as precedent supporting application of rational basis review to case where surviving member
of unmarried same-sex couple sought an incident of marriage without stating that plaintiff’s
constitutional claim in fact depended on a constitutional right to marry).
73. See Mark Strasser, When a Baker Summary Dismissal Becomes Stale: On Same-Sex
Marriage Bans and Federal Constitutional Guarantees, 17 J. Gender Race & Just. 137, 162
(2014) (“[S]ince Baker was decided, significant developments in equal protection and due
process jurisprudence make it difficult to understand how courts can plausibly claim the deci-

172

Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality		

		

Volume 3, Issue 2

and the precedents is that Baker was not dispositive even before Windsor, this
seems to be an area where Windsor has left a wake of legal repercussions.
sion binding.”). One federal court adhered to Baker in a pro se prison inmate’s case without
addressing whether subsequent doctrinal developments have rendered Baker no longer binding. See Merritt v. Attorney Gen., No. 13-00215-BAJ-SCR, 2013 WL 6044329, at *2 (M.D.
La. Nov. 14, 2013) (citing Baker for proposition that “the Constitution does not require States
to permit same-sex marriages” without even acknowledging existence of subsequent doctrinal
developments exception to binding force of summary rulings such as Baker). One state trial
court claimed to have rejected the subsequent doctrinal developments contention, but in a
logically weak argument that suggested he was leaving that issue to higher courts to resolve.
See Borman v. Pyles-Borman, No. 2014-CV-36, 2014 WL 4251133 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Aug. 5,
2014).
A federal district court in Puerto Rico held that Baker was binding and precluded litigation over the constitutionality of state laws excluding same-sex couples from civil marriage
in Conde-Vidal v. Garcia-Padilla, No. 14-cv-1253, 2014 WL 5361987 (D.P.R. Oct. 21, 2014),
yet it seemed to rely on precedents about adherence to Supreme Court decisions with opinions, id. at *5 (quoting Rodriguez v. de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,
484 (1989), and Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997)), to reject the Supreme Court’s
subsequent doctrinal developments principle, Conde-Vidal, 2014 WL 5361987, at *9 (“Lower
courts, then, do not have the option of departing from disfavored precedent under a nebulous ‘doctrinal developments’ test.”). Conde-Vidal also misread Windsor as either having no
bearing on the issue before the district court or actually supporting Puerto Rico: “If anything,
Windsor . . . reaffirms the States’ authority over marriage, buttressing Baker’s conclusion that
marriage is simply not a federal question.” Id. at *8 (emphasis added). Aside from its offering
no argument that a federal territory such as Puerto Rico should have the same legislative authority and independence as a state, whose existence is constitutionally guaranteed, the court
here failed even to note that Windsor was hardly a simple ode to state choice in marriage
laws. Instead, as courts treating Windsor as a subsequent doctrinal development have noted,
Windsor repeatedly insisted that state exercises of authority over marriage must comport with
constitutional restrictions. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2680, 2691, 2692.
And a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit apparently held in
DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), that Baker was binding on lower courts and
barred the court from ruling for the plaintiffs. Like the Puerto Rico District Court, Judge
Jeffrey Sutton’s majority opinion in DeBoer “ignores the Supreme Court’s reasoning about
dignity and equality in U.S. v. Windsor[,] . . . treating the opinion as if it were only about
federalism. He then uses Supreme Court pronouncements about decisions on the merits as an
excuse to impose new rules for lower courts to handle summary dispositions (orders issued
with no opinion or other explanation). Given that little feat of what some might term judicial
activism, it’s a bit cheeky of him to insinuate that all of the many judges who have ruled in
favor of marriage equality have behaved lawlessly, ‘aggressively . . . assum[ing] authority
to overrule Baker [them]selves.’” David B. Cruz, Sixth Circuit Marriage Decision Shuns
Constitutional Law, Reprints Election Results, CruzLines (Nov. 8, 2014), http://cruz-lines.
blogspot.com/2014/11/ sixth-circuit-marriage-decision-shuns.html. Also, if he really thought
his Baker analysis correct, then what follows in his opinion would be twenty-five pages of
dicta. David B. Cruz, 25 Pages of Dicta, or What the Supreme Court Could Say to the Sixth
Circuit, CruzLines (Nov. 7, 2014), http://cruz-lines.blogspot.com/2014/11/25-pages-of-dictaor-what-supreme-court.html.
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Ultimately, the Supreme Court will almost certainly be the court to rule
definitively upon whether the Constitution forbids states from excluding samesex couples from civil marriage and refusing to recognize the marriages they have
entered in an increasing number of states or countries. For the Court, a more than
four-decades-old summary disposition is likely to pose no obstacle to consideration
of those constitutional questions on the merits. And, if Justice Ginsburg’s assessment
is correct, the Court will do so soon, ruling no later than the end of June 2016.74
Nonetheless, whether lower courts are bound by Baker is a vitally important question.
Although broad judicial invalidations of many states’ marriage bans have
been stayed to allow defenders to seek Supreme Court review, in a number of
cases courts have ruled that individuals who have terminal illnesses may marry
without delay.75 Every day that same-sex couples are denied the right to marry
or recognition of their marriage, they and their families suffer injuries, but the
potential for grievous, irreparable injury where one is terminally ill is not a mere
contingency—anyone could have a fatal accident and be robbed of all opportunity
to marry—but a near certainty.
In Baker, a same-sex couple challenged Minnesota’s refusal to let them
marry on grounds that it violated their constitutional rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment, including their fundamental right to marry and their right to equal
protection of the laws.76 The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the claims, and
the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the couple’s appeal on the ground that it did
not present a substantial federal question.77 Such a summary dismissal counts as a
decision on the merits,78 binding on lower courts as to “the precise issues presented
[to] and necessarily decided by” the Court in concluding that a case presented no
substantial federal question.79
Accordingly, a question that has frequently arisen in the post-Windsor wave
of litigation seeking to vindicate same-sex couples’ constitutional rights to marry and
to equal protection is whether Baker v. Nelson is dispositive of the constitutionality
of state marriage exclusions. Defenders of such measures claim that Baker compels
lower courts to uphold state laws barring same-sex couples from marrying.80
74. Mark Sherman, Justice Ginsburg: Supreme Court Won’t ‘Duck’ Gay Marriage, Seattle
Times (July 31, 2014), http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2024212965_ginsburgduckxml.html.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 7, 9.
76. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
77. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
78. E.g., Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S.
463, 477 n.20 (1979).
79. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977) (per curiam).
80. See, e.g., Defendant-Intervenors’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 13, Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 3:09-cv-02292); Lynn D. Wardle
& Lincoln C. Oliphant, In Praise of Loving: Reflections on the “Loving Analogy” for SameSex Marriage, 51 How. L.J. 117, 137−43 (2007); Chad Muir, Note, Perry v. Schwarzenegger:
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Yet the Supreme Court has articulated an important exception to the binding
nature of summary dispositions like that in Baker v. Nelson: the Supreme Court
has specified in Hicks v. Miranda that a summary dismissal is no longer binding
“when doctrinal developments indicate otherwise.”81 Some litigants defending
state marriage exclusions, such as Utah, have argued that the subsequent doctrinal
developments exception articulated in Hicks has been overruled by the Supreme
Court in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.82 Rodriguez de
Quijas stated, “[i]f a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet
appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of
Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the
prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”83 The Kitchen majority distinguished
Rodriguez de Quijas on the ground that it was addressing the treatment to be given
to Supreme Court opinions on the merits, and thus did not “overrul[e] the doctrinal
developments rule as to summary dispositions.”84
Judge Kelly dissented from this conclusion in Kitchen, contending “that is
just another way of stating that a summary disposition is not a merits disposition,
which is patently incorrect.”85 Had the majority judge made that equivalency
claim, it would indeed be patently incorrect as a matter of established doctrine. But
the majority did not say that. What Judge Kelly’s objection overlooks is that the
Kitchen majority did not distinguish summary decisions from Rodriguez de Quijas
on the ground that summary affirmances are not “merits disposition[s]”86 but on the
ground that they are not “opinions on the merits.”87 Because the Court aspires to
give reasons for its constitutional judgments,88 summary decisions offer no reasons,
A Judicial Attack on Traditional Marriage, 22 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 145, 167 (2011)
(“[D]istrict court was bound by Baker and therefore should have granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment . . . .”).
81. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975). Hicks does also endorse the proposition
that “the lower courts are bound by summary decisions by this Court until such time as the
Court informs them that they are not.” Id. at 344−45 (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted). Presumably the Court “informs” lower courts they are no longer bound to a conclusion that a constitutional claim is insubstantial via decisions that “indicate” this. Id.
82. See, e.g., Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1253 n.2 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)).
83. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484.
84. Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1232, 1253 n.2 (citing Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484).
85. Id. at 1232 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
86. Id. (Kelly, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 1253 n.2 (emphasis added).
88. Cf. Earl M. Maltz, The Function of Supreme Court Opinions, 37 Hous. L. Rev. 1395,
1402 (2000) (“The Court is expected not only to determine the victor in the specific lawsuit
before it, but also to provide standards to guide lower courts in disposing of similar controversies that may arise in the future.”). Admittedly, “a substantial number of cases are resolved
[without a statement of reasons from any of the Justices], either because the Court disposes of
them summarily or (much more rarely) because the Court divides equally on an issue.” Id. at
1396.
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Rodriguez de Quijas did not say that it was overruling Hicks’s subsequent doctrinal
developments rule, and Rodriguez de Quijas’s pronunciamento and the regime it
contemplates have been cogently criticized as unsound,89 the Kitchen majority’s
distinction appears proper and the Hicks rule intact.
While the subsequent doctrinal developments rule thus remains, the Supreme
Court has given little express guidance on how strongly doctrinal developments must
“indicate” that a summary dismissal is no longer binding. But it should not be the case
that the doctrinal developments sufficient to indicate that such a dismissal is no longer
binding need be strong enough to dictate a decision upholding the right claimed in the
case dismissed before lower courts can address the merits of similar disputes.
To be specific in this context: the plaintiffs in Baker v. Nelson had argued
that Minnesota’s exclusion of them from civil marriage violated their rights to
equal protection and due process protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
Minnesota Supreme Court rejected these claims.90 The Supreme Court dismissed
their appeal in 1972, ruling without opinion that it did not present a substantial
federal question.91 Unless subsequent developments in the Supreme Court’s equal
protection and due process jurisprudence indicate otherwise, the propositions
necessarily decided by the Supreme Court in Baker remain binding on state and
lower federal courts, which would then have to rule against marriage plaintiffs
presenting indistinguishable legal issues.
But we should not think that lower courts can escape Baker through
the subsequent doctrinal developments exception only if later Supreme Court
decisions inexorably compel the conclusion that state marriage exclusions actually
do violate same-sex couples’ equal protection or due process rights. Unlike most
merits dismissals, summary dismissals contain no legal reasoning, but merely a
conclusion. The conclusion in Baker v. Nelson was not simply that Minnesota’s
marriage exclusion did not violate the plaintiffs’ rights, but the broader conclusion
that the plaintiffs’ claim that Minnesota did violate their rights did not even raise
a constitutional question of substance. Accordingly, for an unreasoned summary
dismissal to be adjudged no longer binding, it should be enough that subsequent
doctrinal developments “indicate” that the types of claims at issue do, under those
later developed doctrines, present a substantial federal question.92 It should not be
necessary for the subsequent developments to go further and establish unequivocally
that the plaintiffs should now win on the merits of their federal constitutional
claim. This is particularly true since the Supreme Court has ruled that summary
89. See, e.g., C. Steven Bradford, Following Dead Precedent: The Supreme Court’s IllAdvised Rejection of Anticipatory Overruling, 59 Fordham L. Rev. 39 (1990); cf. Jonathan L.
Entin, Insubstantial Questions and Federal Jurisdiction: A Footnote to the Term-Limits Debate, 2 Nev. L.J. 608, 617 (2002) (“[T]he Supreme Court has elided the distinction between
jurisdiction and the merits when the substantiality of a federal question is at issue.”).
90. Baker v. Nelson, 185 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
91. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
92. Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 518 (1973) (“[P]revious Supreme Court decisions that
merely render claims of doubtful or questionable merit do not render them insubstantial.”).
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affirmances are “not of the same precedential value as would be an opinion of this
Court treating the question on the merits.”93
And this appears to be the understanding of most courts confronted with
post-Windsor challenges to state marriage exclusions. For example, U.S. District
Judge Robert J. Shelby analyzed Baker v. Nelson in the challenge to Utah’s marriage
exclusions, Kitchen v. Herbert, and concluded “that there is no longer any doubt that
the issue currently before the court in this lawsuit presents a substantial question
of federal law.”94 U.S. District Judge Terence C. Kern concluded in the Oklahoma
litigation Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder that “[i]t seems clear that what was
once deemed an ‘unsubstantial’ question in 1972 would now be deemed ‘substantial’
based on intervening developments in Supreme Court law.”95 As the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit summarized the rule when it affirmed the decision
holding Virginia’s marriage exclusion laws unconstitutional, “[s]ummary dismissals
lose their binding force when ‘doctrinal developments’ illustrate that the Supreme
Court no longer views a question as unsubstantial, regardless of whether the Court
explicitly overrules the case.”96 And in holding that it was legitimate for it to reach
the merits of the challenge to Utah’s marriage exclusions, which it affirmed were
unconstitutional, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit concluded that,
“[a]lthough reasonable judges may disagree on the merits of the same-sex marriage
question, we think it is clear that doctrinal developments foreclose the conclusion
that the issue is, as Baker determined, wholly insubstantial.”97
Regardless of the precise strength of the “indications” from post-Baker v.
Nelson Supreme Court decisions, there is an especially strong case that at least
Baker’s equal protection holding is no longer binding.98 At the time the Court
decided Baker, it had been less than a year since the Court had first found that a law
that discriminated against women violated the Equal Protection Clause;99 the Court
93. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974).
94. Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1195 (D. Utah 2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 1193
(10th Cir. 2014).
95. Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1276 (N.D. Okla. 2014),
aff’d sub nom. Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014).
96. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 373 (4th Cir. 2014).
97. Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1208 (10th Cir. 2014).
98. See Robert E. Rains, The Legal Status of Same-Sex Married Couples in Pennsylvania After the U.S. Supreme Court Decision in the DOMA Case, 85 Pa. B.A. Q. 1, 13 (2014)
(“Clearly, Romer, Lawrence, and especially Windsor constitute enormous doctrinal developments for the rights of gays and lesbians in the United States since Baker was decided.”). By
saying this I by no means intend to imply that doctrinal developments have left insubstantial
the question whether state marriage exclusions violate the fundamental right to marry of
same-sex couples.
99. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), was decided on October 10, 1972, while Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding unconstitutional an Idaho estate administrator law categorically preferring men over women of equally close relationship to decedents), was decided on
November 22, 1971.
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did not explicitly adopt intermediate scrutiny for laws that (as laws barring same-sex
couples from marrying do) discriminate on the basis of sex until 1976;100 the Court
did not apply the Equal Protection Clause to prohibit a law that discriminated on the
basis of sexual orientation (as virtually all courts have concluded laws excluding
same-sex couples from marriage do) until two decades later with Romer v. Evans
in 1996;101 and a number of commentators have taken Romer to apply more than
minimal rational basis review.102
100. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). This is relevant because marriage exclusions do
categorize on the basis of sex, an argument with much academic support, see, e.g., Andrew
Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 197, 214 (1994); Deborah A. Widiss, Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt & Douglas
NeJaime, Exposing Sex Stereotypes in Recent Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence, 30 Harv.
J.L. & Gender 461, 505 (2007) (concluding that “the facial discrimination implicit in the sexbased classifications in state marriage laws is clear”), though limited through recently increasing judicial acceptance, compare, e.g., Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 479−96 (9th Cir. 2014)
(Berzon, J., concurring) (accepting sex discrimination argument), Jernigan v. Crane, No. 4:13cv-00410 KGB, 2014 WL 6685391, at *23−24 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 25, 2014) (same), Lawson v.
Kelly, No. 14-0622-CV-W-ODS, 2014 WL 5810215, at *8 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2014) (same),
Rosenbrahn v. Daugaard, No. 4:14-CV-04081-KES, 2014 WL 6386903, at *10 (D.S.D. Nov.
14, 2014) (same), Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1206 (D. Utah 2013) (concluding Utah marriage exclusion discriminated on basis of sex), aff’d on other grounds, 755 F.3d
1193 (10th Cir. 2014), Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (accepting sex discrimination
argument), and Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 904−06 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (“[T]his is a straightforward case of sex discrimination.”), with
Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1139−40 (D. Or. 2014) (rejecting sex discrimination argument in dicta in case where court held Oregon’s marriage exclusion unconstitutionally discriminated on basis of sexual orientation), Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1008
(W.D. Wis. 2014) (citing cases for proposition that “the sex discrimination theory has been
rejected by most courts to consider it, even those ruling in favor of the plaintiffs on other
grounds” but not finding it necessary to reach the issue), In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384,
436−39 (Cal. 2008) (rejecting sex discrimination argument in dicta where a court held California marriage exclusion unconstitutional under strict scrutiny applicable under state equal
protection guarantee), and Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 10−12 (N.Y. 2006) (rejecting
sex discrimination argument). Justice Kennedy, at least, finds the question of whether the
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage is, constitutionally speaking, sex discrimination, to be “a difficult question that [he has] been trying to wrestle with.” Transcript of Oral
Argument at 13, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144).
101. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
102. See, e.g., Caren G. Dubnoff, Romer v. Evans: A Legal and Political Analysis, 15 Law
& Ineq. 275, 296 (1997) (“[T]he Court [in Romer] perceived no need to utilize its traditional
two-tiered analytic framework nor did it need to explicitly invoke either strict scrutiny or a
rational basis test. Instead, the Court implicitly drew elements from each.”); Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 89, 93 (1997)
(“The Court’s opinion [in Romer] implicitly invokes a defect in the political process that
contaminates, at least to some extent, all laws that discriminate against gays. That contamination, however, implies that gays ought to be a ‘suspect class,’ and that laws discriminating
against gays should be presumptively unconstitutional.”); Nancy C. Marcus, Deeply Rooted
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The first lower court decision to engage with Baker after the Supreme
Court decided Windsor was U.S. District Judge Robert Shelby’s opinion holding
Utah’s marriage exclusions unconstitutional in Kitchen v. Herbert.103 Although
Judge Shelby could have relied solely on arguments like the foregoing, which he
made,104 he chose also to take guidance from—or perhaps seek cover beneath—
Windsor, which he treated as a “significant doctrinal development.”105 The precise
development is not spelled out in his Baker analysis, but he takes apparent comfort
from the fact that some Supreme Court Justices, including dissenters Roberts and
Scalia, foresaw post-Windsor marriage litigation challenging state exclusions,106
coupled with the Supreme Court’s reliance on standing doctrine to dismiss the
appeal in Hollingsworth v. Perry107 rather than dismissing it on the strength of
Baker for not presenting a substantial federal question.108
The latter argument is not strong. If, as the Court held in Perry, the
proponents who were trying to defend California’s marriage ban lacked Article III
standing, the Court would lack jurisdiction over their appeal. Thus, the Court would
not have the constitutional authority to render judgment on the merits of that case.109
Since a ruling that a case does not present a substantial federal question is, as noted
Principles of Equal Liberty, Not “Argle-Bargle”: The Inevitability of Marriage Equality After
Windsor, 23 Tul. J.L. & Sexuality 17, 35 (2014) (“The Court in Romer engaged in a less
deferential form of rational basis review . . . .”); Timothy M. Tymkovich, John Daniel Dailey
& Paul Fraley, A Tale of Three Theories: Reason and Prejudice in the Battle Over Amendment
2, 68 Colo. L. Rev. 287, 333 (1997); Peter J. Smith, Note, The Demise of Three-Tiered Review: Has the Supreme Court Adopted a “Sliding Scale” Approach Toward Equal Protection
Jurisprudence?, 23 J. Contemp. L. 475, 476 (1997) (“Romer v. Evans reflected an enhanced
version of the rational basis inquiry . . . .”). But see, e.g., Larry Alexander, Sometimes Better
Boring and Correct: Romer v. Evans as an Exercise of Ordinary Equal Protection Analysis,
68 U. Colo. L. Rev. 335 (1997); Nan D. Hunter, Proportional Equality: Readings of Romer,
89 Ky. L.J. 885, 891, 895 (2001) (“[Romer v. Evans] did not apply heightened scrutiny to
classifications based on sexual orientation. . . . One of the paradoxes of the Court’s decision
in Romer is the contrast between the simplicity of what we understand as the normal rational
basis test and the complications of the Court’s deployment of it in the opinion. . . . Romer’s
reasoning is multidimensional, not linear, in the way that it alters the logic of equal protection
analysis.”).
103. 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013).
104. Id. at 1194−95.
105. Id. at 1195.
106. Id.
107. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
108. Kitchen, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1195.
109. Cf. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y v. Brown, 187 U.S. 308, 315 (1902) (“[T]he
unsubstantiality of the Federal question for the purpose of the motion to dismiss and its
unsubstantiality for the purpose of the motion to affirm are one and the same thing . . . . [T]
he better practice is to cause our decree to respond to the question which arises first in order
for decision, that is, the motion to dismiss [for lack of jurisdiction due to want of a substantial
federal question].”).
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above, a ruling on the merits,110 the Supreme Court arguably had no power to issue
a Baker-based dismissal in Perry, even if Baker were still good law. Moreover,
the reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the Perry case relied
on the fact that same-sex couples in California enjoyed a right to marry under the
California Constitution prior to Proposition 8 taking that right away and enshrining
that deprivation in the state constitution.111 This differs from the situation in Baker
v. Nelson, where same-sex couples were simply excluded from marriage by state
statutory law.112 Thus, even were Baker binding, it would not necessarily establish
the constitutionality of California’s Proposition 8, and the Supreme Court’s failure
to invoke Baker as the basis for dismissing Perry by itself need not signify that
Baker no longer requires courts to uphold a straightforward exclusion of same-sex
couples from civil marriage.113
Similarly, in Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, the next post-Windsor
opinion to consider Baker, Judge Terence C. Kern of the Northern District of
Oklahoma held that “Baker v. Nelson is not binding precedent.”114 After providing a
persuasive account of the doctrinal developments that supported this conclusion,115
including Windsor itself, due to its constitutional reasoning that the federal
government’s discrimination against married same-sex couples “demean[ed]”
them,116 Judge Kern reasoned much as Judge Shelby had about Windsor’s import:
“If Baker is binding, lower courts would have no reason to apply or distinguish
Windsor, and all this judicial hand-wringing [in the Roberts and Scalia dissents]
over how lower courts should apply Windsor would be superfluous.”117
Chief Judge Robert C. Chambers of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia followed suit in McGee v. Cole.118 Ruling on a summary
judgment motion in a case challenging that state’s marriage exclusions, he too
110. See supra text accompanying notes 78−79.
111. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1063 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
112. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971) (denial of marriage license pursuant to
Minnesota state statute), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
113. Moreover, Baker v. Nelson involved an appeal as of right from the Minnesota Supreme
Court to the U.S. Supreme Court. Due to statutory changes, such appeals as of right are now
quite rare. In Perry, in contrast, the Court had exercised its discretion over its jurisdiction to
grant certiorari to hear the case. Cf. Francisco Ed. Lim, Determining the Reach and Content
of Summary Decisions, 8 Rev. Litig. 165, 166−67 (1989) (distinguishing appellate jurisdiction from certiorari jurisdiction with respect to precedential value). This difference also may
counsel against attributing much significance to the Court’s not invoking Baker to dispose of
Perry.
114. 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1274 (N.D. Okla. 2014).
115. See id. at 1276 (addressing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620 (1996), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
116. Id. (quoting United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013)).
117. Id. at 1277.
118. 993 F. Supp. 2d 639 (S.D. W. Va. 2014).
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concluded that “Baker is nonbinding” on the basis of doctrinal developments.119 Judge
Chambers recounted the analysis from the Second Circuit in its Windsor decision
(prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling),120 but went on to recount and rely upon Kitchen’s
and Bishop’s “persuasive” reasoning about how Windsor demonstrated the Justices’
expectations that lower courts would reason about state marriage bans based on
Windsor (rather than Baker).121 McGee also dismissed contrary lower court decisions
about Baker both as substantively incorrect and as distinguishable precisely because
they were rendered before the additional “doctrinal development” of Windsor.122
With no new analysis of its own, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia concluded (before granting the plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment) in Bostic v. Rainey that “doctrinal developments in the question of who
among our citizens are permitted to exercise the right to marry have foreclosed the
previously precedential nature of the summary dismissal in Baker.”123 Judge Arenda
L. Wright Allen relied in Bostic on the analyses in the Second Circuit Windsor
decision and the Kitchen, Bishop, and McGee decisions.124
Likewise, De Leon v. Perry, the next pro-marriage equality decision to
consider Baker v. Nelson, also ruled that “Baker is not controlling.”125 The U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Texas considered the same sort of
doctrinal developments addressed above, including the Supreme Court’s decision
in Windsor,126 made the same dubious “failure to dismiss for want of substantial
federal question” argument Kitchen made about Hollingsworth v. Perry,127 and
expressly aligned itself with Bostic, Bishop, and Kitchen.128
119. Id. at 650.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 651.
122. See id. (“Both cases preceded the Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor [sic], a decision which, as explained above, showed additional doctrinal development in relevant jurisprudence. The Court disagrees with the analysis of doctrinal developments conducted in those
two cases and accordingly finds that Baker is not binding on the current case and does not
justify abstention here.”).
123. 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 470 (E.D. Va. 2014).
124. Id. at 469−70 & n.7.
125. 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 648 (W.D. Tex. 2014).
126. See id. at 647−48.
127. Id. at 648−49.
128. Id. De Leon v. Perry stated that Bourke v. Beshear also “reject[ed] the argument that
Baker still has precedential value and bars courts from addressing the issue of same-sex marriage.” Id. (citing Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542 (W.D. Ky. 2014), rev’d sub nom.
DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014)). The district court in Bourke, however, did
not analyze whether Baker was no longer controlling due to doctrinal developments after
that decision. Rather, Bourke distinguished Baker as involving the constitutionality of a state
refusal to issue a same-sex couple a marriage license, whereas the Bourke plaintiffs were
lawfully married in other states and asking Kentucky to recognize and treat them as married.
Bourke, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 543, 549 & n.13.
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DeBoer v. Snyder continued the clear trend by rejecting the defendants’
Baker argument in a footnote that extensively quoted and expressly adopted
Kitchen’s analysis, including Kitchen’s reliance on Windsor.129 The court in Latta
v. Otter pointed to the same doctrinal developments these cases have noted, again
including Windsor itself; in Latta, U.S. Chief Magistrate Judge Candy Wagahoff
Dale stated that “the Court dramatically changed tone [in Windsor] with regard
to laws that withhold marriage benefits from same-sex couples.”130 In addition to
recycling the Hollingsworth v. Perry argument, Latta considered significant both
Windsor’s equal protection reasoning and its affirmance of the Second Circuit panel
decision that had held Baker no longer controlling.131 And after remarking upon
the unanimity to that point of lower court rejections of Baker after the Supreme
Court’s Windsor decision, the district court concluded that “Baker is not controlling
and does not bar review of Plaintiffs’ claims.”132 U.S. District Judge John E. Jones
III fell in line on May 20, 2014, rejecting the defendants’ Baker argument before
holding Pennsylvania’s marriage ban unconstitutional in Whitewood v. Wolf.133 He
too included the Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor as part of a “sea change” in
the Supreme Court’s equal protection and substantive due process doctrine.134
Senior (former Chief) District Judge Barbara B. Crabb conducted an
extensive analysis of Windsor’s relevance to the Baker issue in her opinion holding
Wisconsin’s marriage law unconstitutional in Wolf v. Walker on June 6, 2014.135
After explaining why “[i]t would be an understatement to say that the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence on issues similar to those raised in Baker has developed
substantially since 1972[,]” Judge Crabb turned to Windsor.136 She observed that
Baker’s bindingness was hotly contested, with the “no longer binding” camp
prevailing in Windsor in the Second Circuit and the marriage exclusionists137
renewing their arguments before the Supreme Court.138 Judge Crabb noted that
129. 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 773 n.6 (E.D. Mich. 2014), rev’d, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014).
The district court in Geiger v. Kitzhaber likewise dispatched Baker in a footnote, quoting
Kitchen’s conclusion on this point and merely citing DeBoer, Bishop, De Leon, and Bostic.
994 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1133 n.1 (D. Or. 2014).
130. 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1066−67 (D. Idaho 2014).
131. Id. at 1067−68.
132. Id.
133. 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 419, 431 (M.D. Pa. 2014). Judge Jones had earlier rejected the
Baker argument when he rejected the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Whitewood v. Wolf, No.
1:13-cv-01861-JEJ, at 6 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2013). His May 20, 2014, opinion reiterated his
arguments from his November 15, 2013, order. Whitewood, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 419.
134. Whitewood, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 420.
135. 986 F. Supp. 2d 982 (W.D. Wis. 2014).
136. Id. at 990.
137. David B. Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 997, 1078 (2002)
(defining “marriage exclusionists” as “those people who would continue to exclude same-sex
couples” from civil marriage).
138. Wolf, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 990.

182

Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality		

		

Volume 3, Issue 2

Justice Ginsburg cut off counsel in Hollingsworth v. Perry when he tried to address
Baker at oral argument.139 (Though this may well bear on the predictive question
of whether a majority of the Justices would conclude that state marriage bans,
including California’s Proposition 8 at issue in Perry, are constitutional, a single
Justice’s views about doctrinal developments140 would not themselves seem to be a
“doctrinal development” in the sense relevant to the vitality vel non of a summary
dismissal.) Windsor itself did not address Baker, and for Judge Crabb, “[t]he Court’s
silence is telling.”141 In her view, “the Court’s failure to even acknowledge Baker
as relevant in a case involving a restriction on marriage between same-sex persons
supports a view that the Court sees Baker as a dead letter.”142 And, like the Kitchen
and Bishop courts, Judge Crabb also apparently deemed it relevant that the Windsor
dissenters’ advice to lower court judges did not even bother to suggest that Baker
could provide a basis for ruling against marriage equality plaintiffs.143
In the Kitchen litigation against Utah’s marriage exclusions, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s constitutional rulings
one day shy of a year after the Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor.144 Like
virtually all courts to examine Baker in the wake of Windsor, the court of appeals
concluded emphatically that “it is clear that doctrinal developments foreclose the
conclusion that the issue is, as Baker determined, wholly insubstantial.”145 The
court of appeals agreed with the district court that Baker had been superseded by
subsequent doctrinal developments, but it relied on “[t]wo landmark decisions
by the Supreme Court,” Lawrence v. Texas and United States v. Windsor.146 The
disposition in Windsor allowed the court of appeals in Kitchen to distinguish the
views of “several courts” that before Windsor found Baker binding from the
139. Id.
140. Id. (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652
(2013) (No. 12-144) (Ginsburg, J.) (“Mr. Cooper, Baker v. Nelson was 1971. The Supreme
Court hadn’t even decided that gender-based classifications get any kind of heightened scrutiny.”)).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 990−91.
143. Id. at 991. Senior District Judge John G. Heyburn II cited Wolf and echoed many of
its arguments about Windsor in his opinion holding unconstitutional Kentucky’s laws barring
same-sex couples from marrying. Love v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536, 541−42 (W.D. Ky.
2014) (concluding that “a virtual tidal wave of pertinent doctrinal developments has swept
across the constitutional landscape” and making Wolf’s argument about Windsor’s silence
regarding Baker).
144. Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1229−30 (10th Cir. 2013).
145. Id. at 1208. The same panel of judges on the same court reached the same decision
in Bishop v. Smith, treating the litigation against Oklahoma’s marriage exclusions “largely
controlled by our decision in Kitchen.” 760 F.3d 1070, 1079 (10th Cir. 2014).
146. Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1205−08 (citing 539 U.S. 558 (2003), 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)).
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views of “nearly every federal court to have considered the issue” after Windsor.147
Recognizing that Windsor addressed the constitutionality of a federal marriage
exclusion, as distinguished from the state marriage exclusions at issue in Kitchen,
the court of appeals properly noted that “the Court’s description of the issue [in
Windsor] indicates that its holding was not solely based on the scope of federal
versus state powers.”148 The court of appeals concluded that “the similarity between
the claims at issue in Windsor and those asserted by the plaintiffs in this case cannot
be ignored”; some of the plaintiffs sought recognition of their valid marriages from
marriage equality states, as Edie Windsor had from the federal government, and all
of the plaintiffs argued, in Windsorian terms, “that the state’s differential treatment
of them as compared to opposite-sex couples demeans and undermines their
relationships and their personal autonomy.”149 Thus, Baker’s holding that marriage
equality plaintiffs present no substantial federal question was no longer good law
after Windsor.150
The same day that the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled in
Kitchen, Chief Judge Richard L. Young of the Southern District of Indiana also
held in Baskin v. Bogan that Baker v. Nelson was stripped of its binding character
by subsequent doctrinal developments.151 After retreading ground covered by
prior opinions,152 Chief Judge Young confidently concluded that “in the last year
even more has changed in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence shedding any doubt
regarding the effect of Baker.”153 Besides questionably relying on Hollingsworth
v. Perry’s dismissal of the appeal for want of standing rather than for want of a
substantial federal question,154 the court referred to the substantive, dignity- and
equality-based reasoning of United States v. Windsor.155
147. Id. at 1205−06. The court of appeals noted at the close of a string cite that the sole
case at that time to have ruled differently on Baker after Windsor failed to consider whether
doctrinal developments had deprived Baker of precedential force. Id. (citing Merritt v. Attorney Gen., No. 13–00215–BAJ–SCR, 2013 WL 6044329, at *2 (M.D. La. Nov. 13, 2013)).
148. Id. at 1206.
149. Id. at 1207−08.
150. Judge Kelly in dissent purportedly rejected the conclusion that subsequent doctrinal
developments had deprived Baker v. Nelson of binding force. See id. at 1230−33 (Kelly, J.,
dissenting). Somewhat inconsistently, however, Judge Kelly went on to address the merits of
the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, ostensibly “[b]ecause [he] ha[d] not persuaded the panel.”
Id. at 1233−40. Presumably the point of this was to show that if he were to find himself free
to reach the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims, though he is not, he would reject them.
151. 12 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1154−55 (S.D. Ind. 2014).
152. See id. at 1153−56 (addressing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003); Romer
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344–45 (1975); Baker v.
Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972)).
153. Id. at 1154.
154. Id. at 1155.
155. See id. at 1154−55 (citing United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693−94 (2013)
(Windsor reasoned DOMA’s non-recognition of couples validly married by a state “de-
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